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Abstract
The paper investigates and compares the relationship between inflation and inflation uncer-
tainty under inflation targeting and, alternatively, a conventional fixed exchange rate system,
for a group of emerging countries. To do so we estimate GARCH in mean models and we
find that there is a bi-directional relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty under
the two monetary regimes. It is also found that the fixed exchange rate regime has no impact
on average inflation and inflation inertia, while inflation targeting has been successful at low-
ering both average inflation and inflation persistence.
Introduction
Since the introduction of fiat money, inflation has become an important problem. This is
because inflation may have negative effects on economic dynamics, nominal wages and the
intertemporal decisions of market agents. However, the historical evidence on inflation from
the last century reveals that the discretionary money standard which are bound to a fixed
exchange rate regime and with an independent central bank were less exposed to high inflation
[1]. Therefore, the inflationary bias that might be created in the absence of monetary rules has
highlighted the need for monetary regimes with a clear monetary constitution.
Nonetheless, there is a general consensus that the social and financial costs attributed to
inflation are due mainly to uncertainty about future inflation. The nexus between inflation
and inflation uncertainty has gained attention in the literature after the Nobel lecture of [2]
pointing out that inflation causes higher inflation uncertainty. The positive relationship
between the two variables is theoretically justified by [3], who shows that weak policy makers
are more likely to permit inflation during high-inflation episodes, which produces more infla-
tion uncertainty. [4], on the other hand, reveal that inflation uncertainty leads to higher infla-
tion while [5] states that central banks could respond to inflation uncertainty through
lowering the money stock; such a stability reaction would make the nexus.
Hence, a large number of studies have been carried out to assess the validity of Friedman-
Ball (F-B) and Cukierman and Meltzer (C-M) hypotheses; the literature has grown after the
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development of the Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) and Generalised
ARCH (GARCH) techniques, by [6] and [7], respectively. However, only a few studies, e.g.,
[8], [9], [10], have considered the impact of monetary regimes upon the nexus and focused
mainly on inflation targeting (IT) and the monetary union regime. In addition, far too little
attention has been paid to cases with soft fixed exchange rates. In some studies e.g., [11] and
[12], the role of the regime on the nexus has been ignored altogether.
Therefore, this paper investigates the nexus between inflation and inflation uncertainty in
emerging market economies under two monetary anchors: a soft pegged exchange rate (FER)
to the US dollar and IT. The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we test the F-B and C-M
hypotheses under the two regimes. Secondly, we evaluate the plausible effects of adopting a
specific quantitative target on inflation uncertainty. To do this, different GARCH in Mean
(GARCH-M) models are constructed to investigate the relationship in two countries with a
fixed exchange rate to the US dollar: Jordan and Egypt, and three inflation targeters: South
Africa, Brazil and Poland. Note that Egypt has now abandoned the fixed exchange rate system,
so the study compares between the time during the fixed system and after abandoning it.
The plan of this paper is as follows; section two provides the literature review. Section three
discusses the methodology applied. Section four presents the data and country selection crite-
ria. The results and concluding remarks are provided in sections five and six, respectively.
Literature review
It is widely believed that the adverse impact of inflation can be limited if inflation is fully antic-
ipated. This notion indicates that the emphasis should be placed on what makes inflation vola-
tile and unpredictable. Hence, the real costs of inflation should be linked to uncontrolled
inflation, which affects both the supply and demand sides of the economy, as implied by [13].
Due to unanticipated demand shocks, inflation may increase interest rates, which thereby,
impedes investment decisions, reduces the real value of wealth, lowers households’ spending
and encourages imported goods and services. In the absence of full wage indexation, inflation
can have an adverse impact on real incomes. On the supply side, inflation distorts the manage-
ment of economic resources, and adds additional costs to acquire accurate information, which
could potentially be costly, particularly for small firms. The effect of inflation is also tremen-
dously important in financial markets. This is because it influences both ex-ante and ex-post
financial decisions. In fact, as high inflation raises uncertainty about future inflation, market
agents tend to seek higher returns or higher nominal interest rates, while simultaneously trying
to hedge their wealth by spending more resources on forecasting inflation. The forecasts, how-
ever, might mispredict the real inflation, leading to inferior redistributive impacts on agents’
real balances [14].
Some policy makers and economists suggest that the costs of a predictable low and moder-
ate inflation rate are acceptable and supported by the economic theory. However, [15] shows
that an anticipated rate of steady inflation as implied by accelerationists would be ideal to wind
down the social and redistributive costs of inflation, but such a steady inflation level is difficult
to achieve due to inflation expectations, which hinge substantially upon the type of govern-
ment in power and the trade-off between employment and inflation. Consequently, he points
out that the acceptance of moderate and steady inflation would trigger higher inflation expec-
tations, which eventually leads to a higher inflation rate. Furthermore, he hypothesises, by ana-
lysing the inflation behaviour for different OECD countries, that high inflation may lead to
higher inflation variability, and that high inflation countries experienced higher inflation vari-
ability. However, the link between inflation and its uncertainty has gained much interest after
the Nobel lecture of [2]. Friedman states that the relationship between unemployment and
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
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nominal wage changes is not stable owning to inflation uncertainty, which increases with the
level of inflation. He further argued that inflation-inflation uncertainty leads to lower output
growth; however, this impact is unsettled in the literature and depends on whether money is
considered to be neutral; see e.g., [16], [17], [18]. Recent studies have shown that the link exists
in practice, but the effect of inflation on economic growth comes through inflation uncer-
tainty, see [8], [19]. [20], on the other hand, finds that output growth is not affected by infla-
tion uncertainty. [3] supports the hypothesis suggested by Friedman that high inflation leads
to higher inflation uncertainty. He bases his argument on a monetary policy-time inconsis-
tency game theoretical model of [21], where market agents are uncertain about the type of gov-
ernment in power. As long as inflation remains low, both weak and strong types of policy
makers will keep it low. Yet, the dilemma appears when inflation could be permitted by the
weak policy maker, during high inflation episodes, and thereby, inflation uncertainty will tend
to be high when inflation is high. On the other hand, on the basis of the same time inconsis-
tency model, [4] argue that, as central bankers are motivated to create surprise inflation to
stimulate the economic activity, an increase in inflation variability raises the inflation rate. Pol-
icy makers may increase an optimal inflation rate to benefit from low unemployment, see [22],
or to lower the public debt, see [23] for further detail. In other words, for Friedman and Ball,
higher inflation creates higher inflation uncertainty, while for Cukieman-Meltzer, the link
goes in the other direction, that is, inflation uncertainty increases inflation. [5], however,
shows that a negative link could be an indicator of the stabilising effects of the monetary
framework conducted by central banks.
A large number of empirical works have attempted to examine the nexus between inflation
and inflation uncertainty using different measures of inflation uncertainty. [24] and [25] study
the nexus for Latin American countries. While the former suggests that market agents update
their inflation expectations adaptively, the latter bases their investigation on rationality of
agents, in which responses to changes in inflation happen over shorter horizons. [25] find that,
by regressing the absolute value of expected inflation errors on realised inflation, higher infla-
tion hinders the predictability of prices changes. However, their results are weaker compared
to [24], in which the latter uses the difference between expected and realised inflation as a mea-
sure of unpredicted inflation. Nevertheless, as it is not possible in reality to determine the infla-
tion expectations formation process employed by market agents, such estimations for the
nexus could be misleading [26]. Hence, other studies have attempted to investigate the rela-
tionship by utilising inflation forecasts gathered from surveys of inflation expectations. [27]
use the mean square of inflation forecast error to proxy for inflation uncertainty, whereas [26]
adopt two other measures of inflation unpredictability along the mean squared error: the abso-
lute forecast error of [24] and the squared forecast error of [28]. Both studies confirm the exis-
tence of a positive relationship between inflation and its unpredictability. [14] employs the
standard deviation of survey participants’ inflation forecasts and proves that uncertainty
increases with inflation. See also [29] and [30].
Although the survey-based measures were believed to be good proxies for inflation uncer-
tainty, such measures were unable to distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks to
inflation, where the latter has a much stronger effect on the intertemporal decision making of
individuals and businesses. Thus, [31] claim that the effect of control errors lasts temporarily
and decays over short periods, whereas inflation has a severe effect on uncertainty at longer
horizons, where permanent shocks dominate. [6] was the first to measure inflation uncertainty
as the conditional variance of inflation to study the relationship between inflation and uncer-
tainty in the United States. In fact, the introduction of Autoregressive Conditional Heterosce-
dasicity (ARCH) and General Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasicity (GARCH)
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
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approaches by [6] and [7], respectively, encouraged a large number of recent empirical studies
examining the link between inflation and inflation uncertainty.
[32] constructs a model which allows for the changes in the structure of inflation to affect
inflation uncertainty. This is performed by incorporating the different aspects of inflation
uncertainty through the Kalman filter: the conditional variance of inflation, the conditional
variance of expected inflation and the conditional variance of steady-state inflation. He applies
the model to the US during the period 1960:01-1988:06 and concludes that inflation raises
inflation uncertainty. [33] examine the relationship utilising a GARCHmodel to produce a
proxy for inflation uncertainty in the G7 countries. Their findings from Granger causality tests
suggest that the nexus is positive as implied by F-B, but little evidence is found in favour of the
C-M hypothesis. [34] and [9], who apply GARCH and GARCH-M, respectively, find evidence
that the F-B hypothesis, for different examined periods, held true for the UK. In fact, most
studies have used either GARCH or GARCH-M to investigate the relationship between infla-
tion and uncertainty, in different countries, reporting mixed results concerning the causality
between inflation and uncertainty; whether it goes from inflation to uncertainty or the oppo-
site; others even find the link to be bi-directional. [35] find evidence for the Friedman hypoth-
esis in the US and the UK, while the results for Japan show that uncertainty affected the level
of inflation as suggested by C-M.
One drawback of the GARCHmodel is that it is unable by its construction to capture asym-
metric responses to positive and negative shocks to inflation. Hence a new family of asymmet-
ric GARCHmodels has evolved to consider the fact that bad news in financial markets has
deeper effects than good news [33]. Subsequently, many studies have constructed different
models of asymmetric GARCH. [36] examine the nexus, for five Asian countries: Indonesia,
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, using EGARCH, and find evidence in favour
of both the F-B and C-M hypotheses. They note that inflation is a threat, even in low inflation
countries, as it leads to increased uncertainty. In a similar vein, [37] use the same model to
generate a measure for inflation uncertainty in Iran and find that inflation granger causes
inflation uncertainty. The same conclusion is reached by [38] and [11], who study the relation-
ship for Pakistan and a number of emerging market economies and the G7, respectively. How-
ever, [11] show that positive shocks to inflation have more powerful impacts on inflation
uncertainty than negative ones, especially in Latin American countries, while [38] find that the
opposite is true for Pakistan. [39] also found that positive inflation shocks have stronger effects
on uncertainty. [40] employs EGARCH-M to investigate the link between inflation, inflation
uncertainty and output growth in Japan. His findings are in the line with [2], that is, high infla-
tion leads to higher inflation uncertainty and lower productivity. He also finds that negative
shocks increase inflation uncertainty more than positive shocks. [41] find that the relationship
between inflation and uncertainty, in five of the six European countries considered in their
analysis, over the period 1960-1999, is consistent with the Friedman hypothesis.
A few studies have applied the Markov regime switching AutoRegressive Heteroscedastic
(SWARCH) model to take account of shifts in the monetary regime in investigating the rela-
tionship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. For Peru, [42] show that the shift to
adopt inflation targeting is characterised by less inflation volatility, and that higher inflation
raises inflation uncertainty. [43] utilise the SWARCHmodel to study the impact of inflation
targeting on inflation uncertainty for a number of developed and emerging market countries.
According to their findings, IT lowers the variance of inflation in most of the countries exam-
ined; however, this positive advantage increases with high level of central bank transparency
and the institutional arrangements.
In fact, the adoption of inflation targeting across many developed and developing central
banks has increased the appetite to discover the benefits of the new framework. [34] suggests
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
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that the announcement of an explicit inflation target has a prominent effect on lowering infla-
tion persistence and uncertainty at long horizons. [44] also supports the Friedman hypothesis
for the United States as the nexus is found to be positively correlated during high inflation
periods. Likewise, [43] find that the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty is
positive and inflation variance has decreased after IT was adopted in most inflation targeters
investigated in his study. Similar findings were obtained by [9] for the UK. [45] also point out
that IT is an optimal anchor for the UK, however, they find that the relationship between infla-
tion and uncertainty has become negative after inflation targeting. Furthermore, [46] [45]
claim that adopting IT in New Zealand and Australia granted monetary authorities more flexi-
bility in setting the nominal interest rates. See also [47] on the relationship between inflation
uncertainty and interest rates for five inflation targeters, and [48] for the effect of inflation tar-
geting on interest rates. Other studies; [49], [50], [10], show that adopting the Euro played a
major positive role in affecting the nexus between inflation and uncertainty. The only study
which compared between two different monetary regimes: currency boards and inflation tar-
geting, for Eastern European countries, is [51], who apply the EGARCHmodel and find sup-
port for the Friedman hypothesis. However, the study fails to determine which monetary
anchor worked better at reducing inflation uncertainty.
Methodology
GARCH-type models have been widely employed to investigate the relationship between infla-
tion and inflation uncertainty, as they provide a time-varying measure for volatility. Neverthe-
less, a standard GARCHmodel does not allow examining the effects of inflation and inflation
uncertainty simultaneously. Hence, the previous statistical technique to study the direction of
the nexus, conducted by some studies, was a two-stage approach, where the conditional vari-
ance of inflation is estimated in the first stage before performing the Granger causality tests to
determine the direction of causality.
However, the GARCH in mean model, developed by [52], permits inflation to be specified
by inflation uncertainty. Therefore, to investigate the relationship simultaneously, the condi-
tional variance of inflation is allowed to be influenced by the mean, and the inflation rate to be
determined by the conditional variance. GARCHmodel estimates a time-varying variance of
residuals which acts as a proxy for unexpected inflation volatility [11]. The GARCH regression
model is built on an autoregressive moving average of a known variable, where the conditional
variance is a linear function of its past values and past squared shocks. This model has an
ARMA construction which makes the model soluble; however, given its quadratic specifica-
tion, the model equalises the effect of positive and negative innovations [53]. Inserting a one-
period lagged inflation in the variance equation allows examination of the hypothesis of [2]
and [3]. In our study, as explained in detail in the results section, the mean equation is built on
AR specifications rather than ARMA process, so the lagged error terms are excluded. These
specifications can be represented as follows:
The mean equation:
pt ¼ a0 þ
Xp
t¼1
aipt i þ
Xq
j¼1
bjďt j þ d
ﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ht
p
þ ďt ð1Þ
The variance equation:
pt ¼ þ
Xp
t¼1
aiď2t 1 þ
Xq
j¼1
bjht j þ lZt 1 ð2Þ
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Where πt−i is the lagged inflation rate; ďt−j is the lagged errors and ďt is the error term, which
has conditional and unconditional mean of zero and conditional variance, ht, given by Eq (2).
The conditional variance is determined by the lagged squared residuals, the lagged conditional
variance and Zt−1, which includes only lags of inflation. Stationarity restrictions of the model
entail that ċi and Čj, the non-negative parameters, must be less that unity. If the sum of the
parameters is equal to one, the conditional variance must be modelled by Integrated GARCH
[54].
If Ď in the mean equation is significantly positive, higher inflation uncertainty generates
higher inflation, as argued by C-M. On the other hand, when the coefficient is significantly
negative, the Holland hypothesis of monetary policy stabilising effect holds true. ĕ in Eq (2)
determines the effect of inflation on inflation uncertainty. Obtaining a positive and significant
coefficient indicates that inflation uncertainty increases with inflation, as suggested by F-B.
Nevertheless, the conditional variance of inflation estimated by GARCH-M is formed to
consider only the magnitude of inflation shocks, ď2t 1, and thereby the sign of innovations is
ignored by the model construction. Hence, to account for possible asymmetric responses to
positive and negative inflation shocks, an asymmetric GARCHmodel, i.e., Exponential
GARCH, is used.
The conditional variance in the EGARCHmodel, put forward by [55], is set in a logarith-
mic form, which does not require imposing artificial non-negativity constraints on the param-
eters to ensure a positive variance. The model representation can be seen as follows:
logh2t ¼ φþ b1
ďt 1
ht 1


 
þ b
2
ďt 1
ht 1
 
þ b
3
logh2t 1 þ lZt 1 ð3Þ
In this case, an asymmetric response to inflation shocks exists if Č26¼0. A significantly posi-
tive Č2 implies that the inflation uncertainty increases more when the economy is hit by a posi-
tive shock, i.e., ďt−1>0, than by a negative inflation shock, i.e., ďt−1<0 [40].
Nevertheless, as policy makers are more concerned with the long-run impact of inflation
uncertainty, and more importantly the impact of a monetary anchor on reducing inflation
uncertainty in the long-run, we utilise the Component GARCH (CGARCH) model, developed
by [56]. This model separates the long-run from short-run components of inflation uncer-
tainty by allowing the mean of the conditional variance to vary around a time varying level, φ.
ht ¼ φt þ a1ðe
2
t 1   φt 1Þ þ b1ðht 1 þ φt 1Þ ð4Þ
ht ¼ φþ rφt 1 þ mðe
2
t 1   ht 1Þ þ lZt 1 ð5Þ
Eq (4) represents the transitory component, which approaches zero with the power of ċ1+
Č1. ρ in the long run component, shown in Eq (5), is usually close to one, as the time varying
trend converges to the mean very slowly. If, 1>ρ>ċ1+Č1, the short run component of inflation
uncertainty will die out more rapidly than the trend. This indicates that the forecasts of the
conditional variance will depend essentially upon the trend [9].
Data and developing countries selection criteria
We select inflation targeters from three different continents that had experienced an economic
and/or political challenge before shifting to IT. The exchange rate targeting countries represent
cases which also experienced a shift in monetary regime during the study period and suffered
from political and economic pressures, criteria which do not apply to most exchange rate peg-
gers, e.g., Gulf States. This selection allows us to highlight how the economies of the examined
countries have benefited from the regime under investigation. The paper implicitly compares
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
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the impact of monetary policy independence on inflation and inflation uncertainty, where
inflation targeting enjoys more monetary policy flexibility compared to the soft pegged
exchange rate system.
Monthly data on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for the period from 1980:01 to 2014:06
are extracted from the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund
for the sample countries, http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61545861. The monetary
regime shift experienced by all the countries allows us to highlight the benefits of the examined
regime in terms of inflation and inflation uncertainty.
Inflation is computed as πt = log cpit − log cpit−1. The inflation series is then adjusted to
remove the seasonality by executing the Census Bureau’s X12 in an additive default mode.
Results
The conditional mean of inflation is specified by constructing several ARMAmodels. Given
that inflation is seasonally adjusted, it is found that including only the autoregressive terms
yields the best model specifications, which is commonly the case in modelling inflation in the
empirical literature [9]. For each country, we begin by incorporating up to twelve AR specifica-
tions to capture the persistence of the data. The length of AR components is shortened on the
basis of Akaike and Schwartz information criteria and by ensuring that all autocorrelation
coefficients up to twelve lags fall inside the non-rejection region, which is also confirmed by
the Q-statistics of [57]. Accordingly, the selected AR process forms the following benchmark-
mean specifications:
Jordan:
pt ¼ g
JO
0
þ gJO
1
pt 2 þ g
JO
2
pt 5 þ g
JO
3
pt 9 þ g
JO
4
pt 12 þ ut ð6Þ
Egypt:
pt ¼ g
EG
0
þ gEG
1
pt 1 þ g
EG
2
pt 9 þ g
EG
3
pt 12 þ ut ð7Þ
South Africa:
pt ¼ g
SA
0
þ gSA
1
pt 1 þ g
SA
2
pt 2 þ g
SA
3
pt 3 þ g
SA
4
pt 7
þgSA
5
pt 8 þ g
SA
6
pt 11 þ g
SA
7
pt 12 þ ut
ð8Þ
Brazil:
pt ¼ g
BR
0
þ gBR
1
pt 1 þ g
BR
2
pt 2 þ g
BR
3
pt 8 þ ut ð9Þ
Poland:
pt ¼ g
PO
0
þ gPO
1
pt 1 þ g
PO
2
pt 2 þ g
PO
3
pt 5 þ g
PO
4
pt 9 þ g
PO
5
pt 11 þ ut ð10Þ
For each country, we split the inflation series between the time before and after adopting
the monetary regime of interest. The preliminary evidence from the OLS regression of the
benchmark models, shown in Tables 1 to 5, suggests that IT has been successful at reducing
the volatility of inflation as the ARCH effect turned insignificant after adopting IT. Interest-
ingly, for Egypt, inflation volatility became lower not during the fixed exchange rate system
but after becoming an inflation targeter, while for Jordan, the impact of exchange rate target-
ing is unclear as the volatility for the period after exchange rate targeting is found at high lags.
In order to examine the simultaneous relationship between inflation and inflation uncer-
tainty, we incorporate the standard deviation in the mean equation as a volatility measure and
augment the variance equation with lagged inflation. Inserting S.D in the mean equation is
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
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used by [58] and [9]. Furthermore, to model the impact of the monetary regime on inflation
dynamics, slope dummies are plugged in to the conditional mean equations, in which the
dummy takes the value of one when the examined monetary regime is in effect, and zero oth-
erwise. We first attempt to introduce the regime slope dummies via different lags, but only two
Table 1. OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Jordan.
coefficient full sample
1981:02-2014:06
pre-target
1981:02-1995:09
post-target
1995:10-2014:06
gJO
0
0.003 0.004 0.003
gJO
2
0.117 0.154 0.002
gJO
5
0.173 0.259 -0.031
gJO
9
0.099 0.125 0.019
gJO
12
-0.100 -0.082 -0.174
ARCH(1) 8.20 5.68 0.218
ARCH(2) 17.36 13.70 0.217
ARCH(12) 26.66 20.25 21.13
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively. Rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level are given by the symbols ,  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t001
Table 2. OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Egypt.
coefficient full sample
1981:02-2014:06
during-target
1981:02-2002:12
opting out
2003:01-2014:06
gEG
0
0.008 0.009 0.007
gEG
1
-0.155 -0.199 0.380
gEG
9
0.124 0.142 -0.098
gEG
12
-0.144 -0.144 -0.084
ARCH(1) 65.02 38.68 0.162
ARCH(2) 71.46 42.85 0.249
ARCH(12) 104.90 62.33 8.85
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively. Rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 5% and 1% significance level are given by the symbols  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t002
Table 3. OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Brazil.
coefficient full sample
1981:02-2014:06
pre-target
1981:02-1999:06
post-target
1999:07-2014:06
gBR
0
0.063 0.110 0.005
gBR
1
0.462 0.447 0.741
gBR
2
0.367 0.358 -0.062
gBR
8
0.085 0.065 0.035
ARCH(1) 25.58 13.08 1.29
ARCH(2) 25.69 13.13 4.36
ARCH(12) 29.16 14.63 8.3
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively. Rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 5% and 1% significance level are given by the symbols  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t003
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
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interactive dummies are selected to interact with their corresponding inflation lags based upon
a significant improvement in the fit of the model. We also employ a constant regime dummy
in the mean equation for the cases where doing so is found to substantially improve the overall
statistical performance. In addition, we account for political circumstances in some countries.
For the two exchange rate targeters, a dummy variable is added to the mean equation to cap-
ture the impact of the Arab Spring on average inflation, in which the dummy is assigned one
for the period from 2011:01 onwards. The unrest and tensions across the Middle East spread
to Jordan and had negative effects on the economy. For instance, the pipelines that carried gas
from Egypt to Jordan were targeted and bombed several times during the uprising, resulting in
oil supply shortage. As a consequence, Jordan was forced to deal with Israel to import gas, as
Israel has become a major gas exporter in the region. However, the pact to deal with Israel trig-
gered more domestic opposition and increased the external debt; see the Daily Mail on 11th
Table 5. OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for Poland.
coefficient full sample
1981:02-2014:06
pre-target
1981:02-1998:08
post-target
1998:09-2014:06
gPO
0
0.008 0.013 0.003
gPO
1
0.218 0.181 0.294
gPO
2
0.232 0.221 0.136
gPO
5
0.138 0.118 0.128
gPO
9
0.114 0.099 0.093
gPO
11
0.181 0.177 0.113
ARCH(1) 19.96 8.34 0.02
ARCH(2) 20.61 9.79 0.03
ARCH(12) 36.78 18.46 1.4
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively. Rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level are given by the symbols ,  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t005
Table 4. OLS estimates of inflation conditional mean for South Africa.
coefficient full sample
1981:02-2014:06
pre-target
1981:02-2000:01
post-target
2000:02-2014:06
gSA
0
0.007 0.008 0.004
gSA
1
0.231 0.139 0.397
gSA
2
0.213 0.228 0.048
gSA
3
0.134 0.108 0.176
gSA
7
0.131 0.173 -0.032
gSA
8
0.100 0.106 0.07
gSA
11
0.106 0.114 0.003
gSA
12
-0.124 -0.089 -0.214
ARCH(1) 34.47 12.82 0.27
ARCH(2) 34.90 13.16 1.77
ARCH(12) 56.67 26.60 18.12
Note: ARCH(1), ARCH(2) and ARCH(12) are ARCH test at 1st, 2nd and 12th lag, respectively. Rejection of the null
hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level are given by the symbols ,  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t004
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December 2014 for more details. The Arab Spring countries are still, at the time of writing this,
being affected by the adverse consequences of the social unrest. For South Africa, a constant
dummy is included to consider the effect of apartheid on inflation, which takes the value of
one for the period before January 1995, and zero for the months thereafter. Hence, the aug-
mented mean equations can be represented as follows:
Jordan:
pt ¼ ðd
JO
1
þ dJO
3
Þpt 2 þ d
JO
4
pt 5 þ d
JO
5
pt 9 þ ðg
JO
2
þ dJO
6
Þpt 12 þ ut ð11Þ
Egypt:
pt ¼ ðd
EG
1
þ dEG
3
Þpt 1 þ d
EG
4
pt 9 þ ðg
EG
2
þ dEG
5
Þpt 12 þ ut ð12Þ
South Africa:
pt ¼ ðd
SA
1
þ dSA
3
Þpt 1 þ d
SA
4
pt 2 þ d
SA
5
pt   3þ dSA
6
pt 7
þdSA
7
pt 8 þ d
SA
8
pt 11 þ ðd
SA
2
þ dSA
9
Þpt 12 þ ut
ð13Þ
Brazil:
pt ¼ ðd
BR
1
þ dBR
3
Þpt 1 þ d
BR
4
pt 2 þ ðd
BR
2
þ dBR
5
Þpt 8 þ ut ð14Þ
Poland:
pt ¼ ðd
PO
1
þ dPO
3
Þpt 1 þ d
PO
4
pt 2 þ ðd
PO
2
þdPO
5
Þpt 5 þ d
PO
6
pt 9 þ d
PO
7
pt 11 þ ut
ð15Þ
A joint significance of the interactive regime dummies is confirmed by a Wald test of
Ď1 = Ď2 = 0. For each country, Chi-square statistics reject the hypothesis that the dummies are
zero at 1% level of significance, as shown in the last row of Tables 6 to 12. The effect of the
monetary regime on inflation inertia is reflected by the sum of the coefficients of the regime
interactive dummy and that of their corresponding lags. A negative slope dummy indicates
that inflation persistence has declined after adopting the examined regime. Note that, as stated
by [9], the effect of inflation regime on the inflation persistence is preferred to be analysed in
the context of the Kalman filter. The results, reported in Tables 6 to 12, imply that IT has been
successful at reducing inflation persistence at a high lag order, as the coefficients of the second
interactive dummies, i.e., Ď2, appear with a negative sign. A large body of literature has pointed
out that IT helps countries with their disinflationary efforts, stabilises inflationary expectations
and enhances the monetary authority’s accountability and transparency, see for example [59],
[60], [61], [62], [63], [64], [59]. This, however, does not apply to Poland, where all the slope
dummies are non-negative, but its regime constant dummy, Dt, plugged in to the mean equa-
tion, shows that the mean of inflation was reduced by IT; this also applies to all the ITers in the
sample. We did not report the results with a constant dummy for the other ITers as the results
were found to be better, in terms of diagnostics, without adding the regime constant. However,
the constant dummy appeared with a negative sign for all the IT cases. We also attempted to
incorporate the regime dummy variable in the variance equations, but the dummy was insig-
nificant for all the cases. For South Africa, the years of apartheid were associated with higher
average inflation, as the constant dummy, APART, presented in Table 10, is significantly posi-
tive under all GARCHmodels. For Egypt and Jordan, the Arab Spring dummy is found to be
insignificant as a constant, but its slope, POL, reported in Tables 6 and 8, has a positive and sig-
nificant influence on the trend at 1%. Note that the ARCH effect exists in the estimated
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EGARCH-Mmodel for Egypt, indicating that the model is not well specified. In general, for
both countries, all GARCH-Mmodels showed better results when the POL-slope dummy and
the regime constant dummy were dropped from the mean equation, see Tables 6 and 8. Unlike
the ITers, the inflation mean of the FER targeters is not affected by the fixed exchange rate
regime. The dummy appears insignificant for Jordan and positive for Egypt. Nonetheless, the
FER system appears to be influential in lowering the inflation inertia in Egypt and Jordan at
the first inflation lag.
The parameter estimates of the inflation uncertainty proxy, incorporated in the mean equa-
tion, have a significantly positive sign for all the countries, indicating that inflation uncertainty
increases inflation, as argued by C-M. On the other hand, we find support for the F-B hypothe-
sis; inflation does generate inflation uncertainty, irrespective of the regime followed. Remark-
ably, the coefficient of the inflation regime slope dummy, ĕ1, employed in the variance
equation, is significant and negative in all the respective countries; however, the magnitude of
the effect is negligible for Egypt. Note that this ignores the models estimated for Egypt and
Table 6. GARCH-Mmodels for Jordan (with dummies).
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt -3.97E-04 -3.20E-04
Pol 0.176 0.187
d
JO
1
-0.148 -0.125
d
JO
2
0.091 0.077
d
JO
3
0.116 0.081
d
JO
4
0.061 0.047
d
JO
5
0.036 0.019
d
JO
6
-0.207 -0.208
Ď 0.328 0.337
conditional variance
ϕ 7.47E-06 -1.590
ċ1 0.027
Č1 0.810 0.127
Č2 0.142
ĕ0 0.003 19.19
ĕ1 -0.002 -25.67
diagnostic statistics
Q(1) = 2.15 Q(1) = 1.27
Q(12) = 13.22 Q(12) = 13.70
Q2(12) = 14.05 Q2(4) = 13.94
TR2(12) = 14.6 TR2(12) = 14.28
Wald test 20.7
Note: Ď tests the validity of [4] hypothesis, where a positive Ď indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation.
ĕ0 is the one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of [2]–[3] hypothesis, where a positive ĕ0 means that
inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Dt is the constant-monetary regime, i.e., fixed exchange rate system, dummy
variable. Pol is the slope dummy that acts for the effect of Arab Spring on average inflation. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., ĕ1 = ĕ2 = 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% and 1%
significance level are given by the symbols  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t006
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Jordan with slope political dummy and regime constant dummy. Nevertheless, this result
shows that both regimes could to a certain extent reduce inflation uncertainty, albeit not
directly, via decreasing the mean of inflation for FER targeters.
For Jordan, the results imply that both negative and positive inflation shocks have the same
influence on inflation uncertainty. The positive and significant Č2 for Egypt, presented in the
second column, EGARCH, of Table 8, indicates that positive shocks trigger more conditional
inflation uncertainty than negative shocks. Similarly, for Brazil, the asymmetric coefficient,
presented in Table 11, suggests that inflation uncertainty increases following a positive infla-
tion shock. However, no asymmetry is found for the two other ITers, implying that the infla-
tion uncertainty process is not influenced by the direction of inflation shocks. Interestingly,
the slope regime dummy, ĕ1, incorporated in the mean equation, remains negative for all the
countries after controlling for asymmetries. Even when CGARCH-M is used in modelling the
inflation variance, the slope dummy has a significantly negative sign for all the countries,
except for South Africa, where the dummy turns insignificant. This finding suggests that FER
Table 7. GARCH-Mmodels for Jordan (without dummies).
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
d
JO
1
-0.143 -0.131 -0.139
d
JO
2
0.063 0.026 0.051
d
JO
3
0.095 0.085 0.117
d
JO
4
0.059 0.113 0.063
d
JO
5
0.058 0.045 0.044
d
JO
6
-0.194 -0.153 -0.179
Ď 0.361 0.341 0.338
conditional variance
ϕ 7.95E-06 -2.493 4.74E-05
ċ1 0.034 0.005
Č1 0.785 0.121 0.764
Č2 0.052
ĕ0 0.003 28.851 0.003
ĕ1 -0.002 -24.709 -0.003
τ
μ 0.025
ρ 0.823
diagnostic statistics
Q(1) = 2.21 Q(1) = 2.34 Q(1) = 2.27
Q(12) = 12.23 Q(12) = 17.85 Q(12) = 13.01
Q2(12) = 14.71 Q2(12) = 21.18 Q2(12)15.26
TR2(12) = 15.22 TR2(12) = 21.05 TR2(12) = 15.82
Wald test 10.58
Note: Ď tests the validity of [4] hypothesis, where a positive Ď indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation.
ĕ0 is the one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of [2]–[3] hypothesis, where a positive ĕ0 means that
inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e.,
ĕ1 = ĕ2 = 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level are given by the symbols , 
and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t007
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system and IT alike are effective in reducing inflation uncertainty in the long run. Generally,
the inflation trend of the ITers approaches the mean quicker than that of the FER targeting
countries. The power of the short-run component of inflation uncertainty is also higher in the
FER targeters. The diagnostic statistics, reported below for each estimated GARCHmodel,
from Tables 6 to 12, indicate that the GARCHmodels are well-specified. The 1st and 12th lag
order of Ljung-Box and the 12th lag squared residuals, as well as the LM test for ARCH, suggest
neither remaining autocorrelation nor a non-constant variance for all the countries, except for
Poland, where ARCH effect remains in the error terms. Poland adopted different monetary
regimes during the 1990s. Moreover, [65] find that the Polish inflation rates are co-moved
with that of the Euro Zone. When the sample is split to cover the time period after IT, all
GARCHmodels exhibit no remaining ARCH effect.
The findings of a positive bi-directional relationship between inflation and inflation uncer-
tainty suggest the need for a monetary anchor to reduce both inflation and inflation uncer-
tainty. In general, inflation targeting countries enjoy lower average inflation and inflation
persistence compared to the time before adopting IT and compared to the countries with FER
Table 8. GARCH-Mmodels for Egypt (with dummies).
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt 0.002
 0.0003
Pol 0.999 0.999
d
EG
1
-0.223 -0.131
d
EG
2
-0.008 -0.137
d
EG
3
0.151 -0.008
d
EG
4
-0.033 -0.001
d
EG
5
-0.083 0.002
Ď 0.621 0.679
conditional variance
ϕ 9.29E-09 0.170
ċ1 0.399
Č1 0.664 0.265
Č2 0.956
ĕ0 3.65E-06 -59.505
ĕ1 4.43E-04 30.83
diagnostic statistics
Q(1) = 3.29 Q(1) = 2.78
Q(12) = 40.10 Q(12) = 14.54
Q2(12) = 4.43 Q2(12) = 24.69
TR2(12) = 4.16 TR2(12) = 26.19
Wald test 16.39
Note: Ď tests the validity of [4] hypothesis, where a positive Ď indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation.
ĕ0 is the one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of [2]–[3] hypothesis, where a positive ĕ0 means that
inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Dt is the constant-monetary regime, i.e., fixed exchange rate system, dummy
variable. Pol is the slope dummy that acts for the effect of Arab Spring on average inflation. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., ĕ1 = ĕ2 = 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level are given by the symbols ,  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t008
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regimes. The two monetary regimes appear effective in reducing inflation uncertainty, even
under the presence of asymmetries in some cases, like Brazil and Egypt. The effect also remains
in the long run, except for South Africa.
For FER countries, the benefits of the regime are not reflected in lower average inflation
and inflation inertia. The constant regime dummy variable, incorporated in the mean equa-
tion, is found to be insignificant for Jordan and positive for Egypt, and although the FER sys-
tem appears effective in reducing inflation uncertainty, the magnitude of the regime dummy
coefficient is close to zero for Egypt. It could be argued that anchoring the exchange rate could
still influence inflation uncertainty as long as the possibility to renege on FER commitment is
not perceived by the market. Several depreciations in the Egyptian Pound affected the mecha-
nism of the FER system and its credibility in the market. Weak economic institutions and
dependency on political authority due to the absence of mutual and clear division between the
central bank and government might hamper the role of the FER as a device for decreasing
inflation and inflation uncertainty. It could be argued that providing the market with a quanti-
tative target for the price stability objective would not be optimal if it were not accompanied
Table 9. GARCH-Mmodels for Egypt (without dummies).
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
d
EG
1
-0.282 -0.263 -0.161
d
EG
2
-0.068 -0.047 -0.034
d
EG
3
0.189 0.204 0.138
d
EG
4
-0.105 -0.071 -0.05
d
EG
5
-0.159 -0.166 -0.151
ĎEG 0.986 0.987 0.984
conditional variance
ϕ 3.18E-07 -0.062 9.88E-05
ċ1 0.091 0.149
Č1 0.892 0.244 0.276
Č2 0.100
ĕ0 0.0003 -5.647 2.45E-05
ĕ1 -0.0004 -1.545 -0.0004
τ
μ 0.032
ρ 0.991
diagnostic statistics
Q(1) = 0.0004 Q(1) = 0.544 Q(1) = 0.18
Q(12) = 5.91 Q(12) = 5.604 Q(12) = 5.71
Q2(12) = 20.35 Q2(12) = 14.74 Q2(12) = 12.94
TR2(12) = 18.44 TR2(12) = 13.48 TR2(12) = 12.53
Wald test 10.39
Note: Ď tests the validity of [4] hypothesis, where a positive Ď indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation.
ĕ0 is the one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of [2]–[3] hypothesis, where a positive ĕ0 means that
inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e.,
ĕ1 = ĕ2 = 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level are given by the symbols , 
and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t009
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with a clear framework for the central bank’s roles and objectives, the features which distin-
guish the IT framework.
The results provide evidence, represented by lower inflation and inflation persistence for
inflation targeting countries, that the IT framework which has a direct quantitative target of
inflation could be a better signalling device than the soft peg. The institutional features which
accompany adopting IT might help the economy to move from high inflation to low inflation
levels, as the credibility of the system, and thereby the policy outcome, hinges upon the devel-
opment of monetary constitutions and transparent policies. The differences in such institu-
tional arrangements might explain why the advantages of the monetary framework differ
across countries.
Table 10. GARCH-Mmodels for South Africa.
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
APART 0.003 0.004 0.003
d
SA
1
0.305 0.348 0.300
d
SA
2
-0.112 -0.104 -0.107
d
SA
3
0.042 0.003 0.032
d
SA
4
0.131 0.165 0.135
d
SA
5
0.129 0.159 0.115
d
SA
6
0.001 -0.009 0.005
d
SA
7
0.077 0.064 0.079
d
SA
8
0.037 0.03 0.036
d
SA
9
-0.166 -0.147 -0.160
Ď 1.557 1.467 1.546
conditional variance
ϕ 5.89E-6 -7.736 7.14E-06
ċ1 0.038 0.001
Č1 0.135 0.034 -0.001
Č2 0.158
ĕ0 0.001 31.769 -0.073
ĕ1 -0.001 -70.414 -0.131
τ
μ 0.028
ρ 0.870
diagnostic statistics
Q(1) = 1.02 Q(1) = 1.25 Q(1) = 1.27
Q(12) = 13.00 Q(12) = 15.21 Q(12) = 14.06
Q2(12) = 25.96 Q2(4) = 20.27 Q2(12) = 25.53
TR2(12) = 21.50 TR2(12) = 18.87 TR2(12) = 21.16
Wald test 10.82
Note: Ď tests the validity of [4] hypothesis, where a positive Ď indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation.
ĕ0 is the one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of [2]–[3] hypothesis, where a positive ĕ0 means that
inflation raises inflation uncertainty. APART is a constant dummy variable capturing the effect of apartheid on
average inflation. Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., ĕ1 = ĕ2 = 0. Rejection of
the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level are given by the symbols ,  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t010
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798 August 28, 2018 15 / 21
Conclusions
The current paper examines the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty in
inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting countries and highlights the role of each mone-
tary anchor in reducing inflation uncertainty. In particular, the paper attempts to underline
the impact of monetary policy regimes on inflation and inflation uncertainty using GARCH
models over the span 01:1980-06:2014.
The results from the OLS of the conditional mean of inflation, run to the time before and
after adopting the examined regime, reveal that inflation targeters, unlike fixed exchange rate
countries, have experienced stable inflation after IT. This is confirmed by the statistics of aver-
age inflation, in which the ITers have enjoyed lower average inflation after shifting to IT; such
desirable effects are not found for exchange rate targeters. This highlights the importance for
our target countries, and in general for structurally similar countries, to move to IT if the target
is to reduce inflation and inflation volatility.
Table 11. GARCH-Mmodels for Brazil.
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
APART 0.003 0.004 0.003
d
BR
1
0.223 0.848 0.227
d
BR
2
-0.294 -0.228 -0.031
d
BR
3
0.532 0.344 0.777
d
BR
4
0.321 0.228 -0.192
d
BR
5
0.069 0.093 -0.042
Ď 0.063 0.456 0.464
conditional variance
ϕ 0.006 5.321 0.004
ċ1 6.861 0.174
Č1 0.142 -0.041 0.167
Č2 0.225
ĕ0 0.256 9.919 0.054
ĕ1 -0.427 -100.193 -0.080
τ
μ 0.169
ρ 0.812
diagnostic statistics
Q(1) = 0.593 Q(1) = 6.18 Q(1) = 1.577
Q(12) = 13.267 Q(12) = 46.93 Q(12) = 202.72
Q2(12) = 0.453 Q2(12) = 0.135 Q2(12) = 1.72
TR2(12) = 0.432 TR2(12) = 1.51 TR2(12) = 1.65
Wald test 1163.90
Note: Ď tests the validity of [4] hypothesis, where a positive Ď indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation.
ĕ0 is the one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of [2]–[3] hypothesis, where a positive ĕ0 means that
inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Wald test examines the significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e.,
ĕ1 = ĕ2 = 0. The sum of ċ1 and Č1 in the conditional variance is larger than one. This is because Brazil was subject to
hyperinflation during 1980s to March 1994. Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level is given by
the symbol .
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t011
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According to our results, inflation targeting appears to be more effective in lowering infla-
tion persistence and inflation uncertainty than the soft fixed exchange rate regime. However, it
is also shown that ITers have not equally benefited from IT. One possible explanation for this
might be institutional differences among countries in terms of the level of central bank inde-
pendence and transparency. Note that countries under the fixed exchange rate lose monetary
freedom, as they have to keep their monetary policies in tune with the base country, but they
can still ensure institutional independence from the political authorities.
In general, the study has made a way towards enhancing the understanding of the effective-
ness of announcing an explicit quantitative target on inflation uncertainty. Furthermore, the
positive relationship found between inflation and inflation uncertainty in both directions
underlines that a monetary regime with an ultimate goal of price stability is a necessity to keep
inflation and inflation uncertainty constrained. Additionally, our findings add to the growing
body of literature on the importance of inflation targeting as a framework for monetary policy.
Table 12. GARCH-Mmodels for Poland.
Coefficients GARCH-M EGARCH-M CGARCH-M
Conditional mean
Dt -0.001
 -0.004
d
PO
1
0.141 0.272 0.142
d
PO
2
0.185 0.264 0.192
d
PO
3
0.182 0.114 0.054
d
PO
4
0.001 -7.51E-05 0.026
d
PO
5
-0.012 -0.061 -0.12
d
PO
6
0.072 0.064 0.068
d
PO
7
0.071 0.081 0.133
Ď 1.439 1.690 1.722
conditional variance
ϕ 2.14E-06 -3.227 6.15E-06
ċ1 0.024 0.047
Č1 0.693 0.035 0.004
Č2 0.017
ĕ0 0.001 29.109 0.001
ĕ1 -0.001 -19.046 -0.001
τ
μ 0.052
ρ 0.562
diagnostic statistics
Q(1) = 0.01 Q(1) = 0.002 Q(1) = 13.15
Q(12) = 9.38 Q(12) = 2.89 Q(12) = 60.50
Q2(12) = 27.85 Q2(12) = 59.30 Q2(12) = 69.59
TR2(12) = 26.21 TR2(12) = 53.59 TR2(12) = 56.38
Wald test 12.46
Note: Ď tests the validity of [4] hypothesis, where a positive Ď indicates that inflation uncertainty increases inflation.
ĕ0 is the one-period lagged inflation and tests the validity of [2]–[3] hypothesis, where a positive ĕ0 means that
inflation raises inflation uncertainty. Dt is the monetary regime-constant dummy variable. Wald test examines the
significance of the interactive regime dummy, i.e., ĕ1 = ĕ2 = 0. Rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level are given by the symbols ,  and , respectively.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798.t012
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IT, according to our results, appears effective in lowering the inflation persistence and inflation
uncertainty more than the soft fixed exchange rate regime. However, it is shown that ITers
have not equally benefited from IT. One possible explanation for this might be due to the insti-
tutional differences among countries in terms of the level of central bank independence and
transparency. Therefore, for further contributions, it would be of important interest to analyse
the plausible impacts of independent monetary practices and constitutions on inflation and
inflation uncertainty, under the two regimes, since exchange rate fixers usually enjoy less insti-
tutional and economic independence.
The countries ranked higher based upon the institutional criteria appear to benefit more
from the quantitative target policy. This stresses that announcing a quantitative target without
a strong, stable and reliable central bank constitution and deeds does not guarantee achieving
low inflation and inflation uncertainty. Given this, the preconditions for adopting IT may play
a central role in maximising the benefits of adopting a quantitative monetary policy which
have important effects on economic welfare.
Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge Juan Paez-Farrell, Jonathan Perraton and Karl Taylor for
comments. Comments from two anonymous referees and the associate editor are gratefully
acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. The views expressed are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the official views of Eesti Pank or other parts of the Eurosystem.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Nora Abu Asab, Juan Carlos Cuestas, Alberto Montagnoli.
Data curation: Nora Abu Asab.
Formal analysis:Nora Abu Asab.
Investigation: Nora Abu Asab, Juan Carlos Cuestas, Alberto Montagnoli.
Writing – original draft:Nora Abu Asab, Juan Carlos Cuestas, Alberto Montagnoli.
Writing – review & editing: Nora Abu Asab, Juan Carlos Cuestas, Alberto Montagnoli.
References
1. Bernholz P. Monetary Regimes and Inflation: History, economic and political relationships. Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar Publishing; 2015.
2. Friedman M. Nobel lecture: inflation and unemployment. The Journal of Political Economy. 1977; 85(3):
451–472. https://doi.org/10.1086/260579
3. Ball L. Why does high inflation raise inflation uncertainty? Journal of Monetary Economics. 1992; 29(3):
371–388. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(92)90032-W
4. Cukierman A, Meltzer AH. A theory of ambiguity, credibility, and inflation under discretion and asymmet-
ric information. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. 1986; 54(5):1099–1128. https://doi.
org/10.2307/1912324
5. Holland AS. Inflation and uncertainty: tests for temporal ordering. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
1995; 27(3):827–837. https://doi.org/10.2307/2077753
6. Engle RF. Autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity with estimates of the variance of United King-
dom inflation. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. 1982; 50(4):987–1007. https://doi.
org/10.2307/1912773
7. Bollerslev T. Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics.
1986; 31(3):307–327. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(86)90063-1
8. Chang KL, He CW. Does the magnitude of the effect of inflation uncertainty on output growth depend on
the level of inflation? The Manchester School. 2010; 78(2):126–148. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
9957.2009.02162.x
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798 August 28, 2018 18 / 21
9. Kontonikas A. Inflation and inflation uncertainty in the United Kingdom, evidence from GARCH model-
ling. Economic Modelling. 2004; 21(3):525–543. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2003.08.001
10. Caporale G, Onorante L, Paesani P. Inflation and inflation uncertainty in the euro area. Empirical Eco-
nomics. 2012; 43(2):597–615. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-011-0489-5
11. Daal E, Naka A, Sanchez B. Re-examining inflation and inflation uncertainty in developed and emerging
countries. Economics Letters. 2005; 89(2):180–186. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.024
12. Samimi AJ, Abdollahi M, Ghader S. Inflation and inflation uncertainty: evidence from MENA. Universal
Journal of Management and Social Sciences. 2012; 2(1):57–62.
13. Ackley G. The costs of inflation. The American Economic Review. 1978; 68(2):149–154.
14. Golob JE. Does inflation uncertainty increase with inflation? Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank
of Kansas City. 1994; 79(3):27–38.
15. Okun AM. The mirage of steady inflation. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. 1971; 2:485–498.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2534234
16. Tobin J. Money and economic growth. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. 1965; 33(4):
671–684. https://doi.org/10.2307/1910352
17. Sidrauski M. Inflation and economic growth. The Journal of Political Economy. 1967; 75(6):796–810.
https://doi.org/10.1086/259360
18. Stockman AC. Anticipated inflation and the capital stock in a cash in-advance economy. Journal of Mon-
etary Economics. 1981; 8(3):387–393. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(81)90018-0
19. Grier KB, Henry O´ T, Olekalns N, Shields K. The asymmetric effects of uncertainty on inflation and out-
put growth. Journal of Applied econometrics. 2004; 19(5):551–565. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.763
20. Fountas S. Inflation, inflation uncertainty and growth: Are they related? Economic Modelling. 2010;
27(5):896–899. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2010.06.001
21. Barro RJ, Gordon DB. Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy. Journal of Mone-
tary Economics. 1983; 12(1):101–121. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(83)90051-X
22. Tobin J. Inflation and unemployment. American Economic Review. 1972; 62(1):1–18.
23. Fischer S, Summers LH. Should nations learn to live with inflation? National Bureau of Economic
Research; 1989; 2815.
24. Glezakos C, Nugent JB. Price instability and inflation: The Latin American case. World Development.
1984; 12(7):755–758. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(84)90086-X
25. Pourgerami A, Maskus KE. The effects of inflation on the predictability of price changes in Latin Amer-
ica: Some estimates and policy implications. World Development. 1987; 15(2):287–290. https://doi.org/
10.1016/0305-750X(87)90083-0
26. Ungar M, Zilberfarb BZ. Inflation and Its Unpredictability–Theory and Empirical Evidence. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking. 1993; 25(4):709–720. https://doi.org/10.2307/2077800
27. Cukierman A, Wachtel P. Inflationary expectations: reply and further thoughts on inflation uncertainty.
The American Economic Review. 1982; 72(3):508–512.
28. Pagan AR, Hall AD, Trivedi PK. Assessing the variability of inflation. The Review of Economic Studies.
1983; 50(4):585–596. https://doi.org/10.2307/2297762
29. Wachtel P. Survey measures of expected inflation and their potential usefulness. In: Analysis of infla-
tion: 1965–1974. NBER; 1977:361–402.
30. Carlson JA. A study of price forecasts. In: Annals of Economic and Social Measurement, Volume 6,
number 1. NBER; 1977: 27–56.
31. Ball L, Cecchetti SG, Gordon RJ. Inflation and uncertainty at short and long horizons. Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity. 1990; 21(1):215–254. https://doi.org/10.2307/2534528
32. Evans M. Discovering the link between inflation rates and inflation uncertainty. Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking. 1991; 23(2):169–184. https://doi.org/10.2307/1992775
33. Grier KB, Perry MJ. On inflation and inflation uncertainty in the G7 countries. Journal of International
Money and Finance. 1998; 17(4):671–689. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-5606(98)00023-0
34. Fountas S. The relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty in the UK: 1885–1998. Econom-
ics Letters. 2001; 74(1):77–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00522-5
35. Conrad C, Karanasos M. On the inflation-uncertainty hypothesis in the USA, Japan and the UK: a dual
long memory approach. Japan and the World Economy. 2005; 17(3):327–343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
japwor.2004.03.002
36. Jiranyakul K, Opiela TP. Inflation and inflation uncertainty in the ASEAN-5 economies. Journal of asian
Economics. 2010; 21(2):105–112. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2009.09.007
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798 August 28, 2018 19 / 21
37. Nazar D, Farshid P, Mojtaba KZ. Asymmetry Effect of Inflation on Inflation Uncertainty in Iran: Using
from EGARCH Model, 1959-2009. American Journal of Applied Sciences. 2010; 7(4):535. https://doi.
org/10.3844/ajassp.2010.535.539
38. Rizvi SKA, Naqvi B. Asymmetric behavior of inflation uncertainty and friedman-ball hypothesis: evi-
dence from pakistan. In: 26th International Symposium on Money, Banking and Finance, Orle´ans,
France; 2009.
39. Yeh CC, Wang KM, Suen YB. A quantile framework for analysing the links between inflation uncertainty
and inflation dynamics across countries. Applied Economics. 2011; 43(20):2593–2602. https://doi.org/
10.1080/00036840903299763
40. Wilson BK. The links between inflation, inflation uncertainty and output growth: New time series evi-
dence from Japan. Journal of Macroeconomics. 2006; 28(3):609–620. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.
2004.11.004
41. Fountas S, Ioannidis A, Karanasos M. Inflation, inflation uncertainty and a common European monetary
policy. Manchester School. 2004; 72(2):221–242. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2004.00390.x
42. Castillo P, Humala A, Tuesta V. Regime shifts and inflation uncertainty in Peru. Journal of Applied Eco-
nomics. 2012; 15(1):71–87. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1514-0326(12)60004-X
43. Tas BKO, Ertugrul HM. Effect of Inflation Targeting on Inflation Uncertainty: A SWARCH Analysis. Aus-
tralian Economic Review. 2013; 46(4):444–459. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8462.12036
44. Kim CJ. Unobserved-component time series models with Markov-switching heteroscedasticity:
Changes in regime and the link between inflation rates and inflation uncertainty. Journal of Business &
Economic Statistics. 1993; 11(3):341–349. https://doi.org/10.1080/07350015.1993.10509962
45. Bhar R, Mallik G. Inflation uncertainty, growth uncertainty, oil prices, and output growth in the UK.
Empirical Economics. 2013; 45(3):1333–1350. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-012-0650-9
46. Bhar R, Mallik G. Inflation, inflation uncertainty and macroeconomic performance in Australia. Economic
Analysis and Policy. 2012; 42(3):305–318. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0313-5926(12)50031-7
47. Mallik G, Bhar R. Has the link between inflation uncertainty and interest rates changed after inflation tar-
geting? Journal of Economic Studies. 2011; 38(6):620–636. https://doi.org/10.1108/
01443581111177358
48. Wright JH. Term premia and inflation uncertainty: Empirical evidence from an international panel data-
set. The American Economic Review. 2011; 101(4):1514–1534. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1514
49. Neanidis KC, Savva CS. Nominal uncertainty and inflation: The role of European Union membership.
Economics Letters. 2011; 112(1):26–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.025
50. Caporale GM, Kontonikas A. The Euro and inflation uncertainty in the European Monetary Union. Jour-
nal of International Money and Finance. 2009; 28(6):954–971. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2008.
09.004
51. Khan M, Kebewar M, Nenovsky N. Inflation Uncertainty, Output Growth Uncertainty and Macroeco-
nomic Performance: Comparing Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes in Eastern Europe. Working
Papers halshs-00804556, HAL. 2013;.
52. Engle RF, Lilien DM, Robins RP. Estimating time varying risk premia in the term structure: The ARCH-
M model. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society. 1987; 55(2):391–407. https://doi.org/10.
2307/1913242
53. Zakoian JM. Threshold heteroskedastic models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and control. 1994;
18(5):931–955. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)90039-6
54. Harvey AC. Dynamic models for volatility and heavy tails: with applications to financial and economic
time series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 2013.
55. Nelson DB. Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: A new approach. Econometrica: Journal of
the Econometric Society. 1991; 59(2):347–370. https://doi.org/10.2307/2938260
56. Lee GG, Engle RF. A permanent and transitory component model of stock return volatility. Available at
SSRN 5848. 1993;.
57. Box GE, Pierce DA. Distribution of residual autocorrelations in autoregressive-integrated moving aver-
age time series models. Journal of the American Statistical Association. 1970; 65(332):1509–1526.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1970.10481180
58. Baillie RT, Chung CF, Tieslau MA. Analysing inflation by the fractionally integrated ARFIMA-GARCH
model. Journal of Applied Econometrics. 1996; 11(1):23–40. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1255
(199601)11:1%3C23::AID-JAE374%3E3.0.CO;2-M
59. Batini N, Laxton D. Under what conditions can inflation targeting be adopted? The experience of emerg-
ing markets. Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series. 2007; 11:467–506.
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798 August 28, 2018 20 / 21
60. Capistra´n C, Ramos-Francia M. Does inflation targeting affect the dispersion of inflation expectations?
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking. 2010; 42(1):113–134. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2009.
00280.x
61. Neumann MJ, Von Hagen J. Does inflation targeting matter? ZEI working paper; 2002;9577.
62. Bernanke BS, Mishkin FS. Inflation targeting: a new framework for monetary policy? National Bureau of
Economic Research; 1997;5893
63. Hu Y. Empirical investigations of inflation targeting. IIE Working Papers Series WP; 2003. 03-6.
64. Walsh CE. Inflation Targeting: What Have We Learned. International Finance. 2009; 12(2):195–233.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2362.2009.01236.x
65. Cuestas JC, Gil-Alana LA, Taylor K. Inflation convergence in Central and Eastern Europe vs the Euro-
zone: non-linearities and long memory. Scottish Journal of Political Economy. 2016; 63(5):519–538
https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12114
Inflation targeting or exchange rate targeting in emerging markets
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0201798 August 28, 2018 21 / 21
